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Uncertainty, Market Power and Credit Rationing 
 
Introduction 
 
Fundamental uncertainty and the assumption of an endogenous money supply have become 
key concepts of Post Keynesian theory. Important aspects of the relationship between 
uncertainty and endogenous money however still remain unexplored. The relationship 
between bank behavior under fundamental uncertainty and access restrictions to credit is 
such an aspect. The nexus between these concepts is the topic of this paper. 
 
Credit restrictions have become an emerging field of research The more recent literature 
hereby is particularly concerned with the credit access of small and medium sized enterprises 
(SMEs). Despite substantial research on financial crises (e.g. Grabel 2000) and bank runs 
(Basu 2003) heterodox authors have left this field of interest largely to the New Institutional 
relationship lending school. The building blocks of the dominant explanation of access 
restrictions to credit thus remain bounded rationality, the principal agent problem and the 
theory of hierarchical control (see Elyasiani and Goldberg 2004 for a survey of this 
literature).  
 
In contrast to this literature this paper is motivated by the presumption that crucial decisions 
underlie fundamental uncertainty (Davidson e.g. 1991). Credit decisions are crucial 
decisions. Thus credit restrictions against specific groups have to be explained in terms of 
uncertainty-analysis (see e.g. Rochon 1999). The starting point hereby is the observation that 
firms are a tool to cope with uncertainty (Dunn 2000) and that uncertainty and power are 
intrinsically linked (Stockhammer 2007). Extending these arguments it is argued that more 
powerful actors can use their position to pass on adverse impacts of uncertain events to 
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others. For the relationship between market participants hereby especially monopsonistic and 
monopolistic power are important. As a result on oligopolistic markets with heterogenous 
firms uncertainty is structurally concentrated amongst less powerful SMEs. This introduces 
systemic biases against SMEs with regard to the availability of external funds; including 
bank credit. Only small banks that have to avoid the monopsonistic power of relatively large 
debtors still provide external finance to SMEs.  
 
The paper is organized as follows. In order to provide some motivation Section 2 briefly 
reviews the empirical evidence that exists with regard to access restrictions to credit. Section 
3 discusses the relationship lending approach to credit rationing. Section 4 presents a possible 
Post Keynesian alternative. Section 5 concludes. 
 
Stylized Facts 
 
The number of empirical surveys with a focus on the specific characteristics of SMEs that 
was published during the last decade is legion. To a large extent these surveys constitute a 
body of literature that aims at supporting the theory of relationship lending (see below). Their 
largely unequivocal findings can be summarized as follows: 
 
1. Small and medium sized enterprises (SME) are generally constrained in their access to 
credit (Waagenvoort 2003, Winker 1999). 
2. Small banks lend proportionately more to small enterprises than large banks (e.g. 
Nakamura 1993, Peek and Rosengreen 1996, Strahan and Weston 1996, 1998). 
Obviously this also indicates that small banks lend proportionately less to large firms 
than large banks. 
3. Relationships with small firms change when a bank grows in size. Especially after 
 3
mergers that result in large post-merger banks lending to SMEs drops significantly (Peek 
and Rosengreen 1996, Berger et al. 1998, Spaienza 2002).  
4. There is contradicting evidence whether the length of a relationship increases credit 
availability (yes: Berger and Udell 1995, Peterson and Rajan 1994, no: Blackwell and 
Winters 1997, Cole et al. 2004). Especially the younger literature has failed to find 
empirical support for an impact of the length of a relationship on credit availability.  
 
From this evidence two crucial questions arise. First, why do SMEs generally suffer from a 
restricted access to credit? A theory that aims at explaining the above mentioned facts 
requires explaining what is peculiar about SMEs that makes them subject to a restricted 
access to credit. Second, how can the reluctance of larger banks to lend to SMEs be 
explained? Or alternatively put why do small banks prefer relationships with small 
borrowers? The most popular explanation for these findings is the theory of relationship 
lending (banking). This approach is briefly presented in the following section. 
 
Relationship Lending 
 
The theory of relationship banking gained increasing popularity over the last decade. The 
starting point of this stream of literature is the theory on information-based banking. Banks 
here play a pivotal role in the retrieval and interpretation of information, which is their most 
important function (e.g. Diamond 1984). They can perform these activities more efficiently 
than a single lender and thus create information-based intangible values. This is the 
background in which banks have to pursue the sole motive of their actions: profit-
maximization.  
 
The pursuit of that goal however is difficult. The environment is complex and it is impossible 
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for decision makers – even for highly specialized banks – to achieve full information about 
the objective risk properties. Strict optimization thus is not possible due to a lack of access to 
and computability of information. However, information appears as strictly additive (e.g. 
Berger and Udell 1998) and uncertainty is merely an epistemological category. Thus decision 
makers develop decisional rules that abstract from the complex environment and rely on a 
reduced subset of information. After an evolutionary process only those rules survive that 
enable to approximate the prevalent (unalterable) probability distribution accurately. 
Decision makers apply bounded rational decision rules (e.g. Simon 2002). 
 
The information that is required for these risk-evaluation procedures however is not easy to 
attain. The possibility remains that banks are not able to reveal all the information which 
their decisional rules require to fully identify the risk-characteristics of a particular borrower. 
Asymmetric information might exist. As a result it is possible that the risk exposure of a 
potential borrower can not be fully identified. Consequently, it is not possible to match each 
borrower with a “fair” loan rate. The pool of applicant might be heterogeneously constituted 
and modifications in the loan rate can alter its risk structure. An increase in the loan rate 
might drive the less risky projects at the margin out and increase the average risk (adverse 
selection). There thus is a ceiling to the loan rate after which banks’ profits become 
depressed. Yet, banks have to obtain funds on the market for loanable funds in order before 
they are able to lend. Given a sufficiently low loan rate this might only allow for a rate paid 
on deposits that is too small to attract sufficient funds on the markets for loanable funds. 
Quantitative credit restrictions are the result (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981; Jaffee and Russell, 
1976).1
 
                                                 
1 The theory on quantitative credit restrictions actually belongs to the New Keynesian literature. Though, it 
forms the motivation and starting point of the New Institutional concept of relationship banking.  
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These informational problems are influenced by the shape – particularly the size – of an 
organization. Banks as well as their potential borrowers are exposed to the principal agent 
problem. The larger an organization becomes the larger the number of hierarchical levels 
between an operative agent and the ultimate principal becomes (Williamson 1975). Thus the 
control of agents is ever more difficult the larger an organization is. In order to be able to 
direct, control and sanction agents in an impersonal environment with many hierarchical 
levels it is necessary to standardize their tasks and targets. The information that is used in 
large organizations consequently comes in the disguise of hard facts. As both large banks and 
large firms thus rely on information of the same type it is easier for them to communicate. In 
smaller organizations on the other hand monitoring of agents comes in a more direct form. 
For the case of a small bank this implies that loan officers can be monitored more directly 
and thus can be granted more (informational) discretion in the lending process. Thus loan 
officers in smaller banks are able to establish a relationship with a potential borrower and to 
‘reconstruct’ the lacking hard information through relationship-experience (Berger and Udell 
1995, Cole et al. 2004). This helps in the communication with smaller firms that – due to 
more direct supervision – rely on similar information. Consequently, SMEs find it easier to 
obtain credit by small banks. 
 
For the proponents of relationship lending this explains the above presented stylized facts. As 
the number of small banks decreases this indicates that the credit availability to SMEs is 
depressed. Nonetheless, the implications deduced from this are relatively sobering. As only 
forecast-efficient decisional rules can survive and as profit-maximization is the pivotal target 
of all actors, institutions will arise that specialize in the particular problems of SMEs. In as 
much as this is not the case, SMEs must have a disadvantage in terms of efficiency. In the 
following section it will be argued that a Post Keynesian explanation leads to substantially 
different results. 
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A Post Keynesian Explanation 
 
The role of banks 
A cornerstone of Post Keynesian theory is the assumption of an endogenous money supply. 
Hereby, banks are not the sober producers of reliable, additive and correct information as in 
the New Institutional perception. In the Post Keynesian theory the importance of banks stems 
from their role in the creation, circulation and credibility-maintenance of money as a 
capitalist institution. To some extent banks can be regarded as ‘producers’ of credit money.  
 
This role however has to be performed in an environment of fundamental uncertainty 
(Davidson 1991). In a situation that underlies fundamental uncertainty a probability 
distribution about the future course of events can not be given. The future course of future 
events is ontologically open (Dunn 2001). Though, uncertainty is not necessarily an 
ontological constant. There may be different ‘degrees’ of uncertainty that can be compared 
against each other in an ordinal way. In this paper a higher degree of uncertainty refers to a 
situation where the amount and potential impact of uncertain events that can affect a 
participant’s economic position is relatively higher than that of another participants.  
 
In such an environment the very function of entrepreneurs is to make crucial (i.e. uncertain) 
decisions (Davidson 1995). The firm hereby has been identified as an attempt to cope with 
the unpredictability of the environment and to maintain flexibility (Dunn 2000). Certainly 
does the conventional notion of profit-maximization as the ultimate goal of all action become 
impracticable for the analysis under uncertainty. Without the possibility to make correct 
forecasts an actor would be nothing but an arbitrary random machine helplessly pending on 
whatever “intuition” her stomach delivers. Under fundamental uncertainty the maximization 
of power must be regarded as the motive of an enterprise’s actions (Lavoie 1992, 99ff.). 
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Power is the mean by which the multi-dimensional target functions that modern enterprises 
necessarily entail can be best pursued. Maximizing power enables to pursue a variety of 
growth, survival and profit targets under a multitude of alternate development paths.  
 
It furthermore has been argued that power and uncertainty are intrinsically linked 
(Stockhammer 2007, Stockhammer and Ramskogler 2007). Thus to some extent power can 
be interpreted as a mean to shift uncertainty and maintain flexibility in an unpredictable 
world. To avoid misunderstanding, it is not implied that uncertainty as such can be shifted 
around the economy like a chessmen. The assumption is made that power enables to 
(contractually) force others to carry adverse impacts of uncertain events (e.g. in the course of 
a market transaction).  
 
In order to maximize power an enterprise has to extend its – direct and indirect – command 
over capital2 (Galbraith 1971 Chap. 5, Dixon 1989, p.589) while at the same time 
minimizing its exposure to uncertainty. In the case of banks this means that they aim at 
expanding their balance sheet total via the creation of credit (next to other financial 
activities). This allows for both, the prospect of sustainable capital gains as well as partial 
control over the fortune of the indebted firms. Certainly banks hereby have to avoid a 
straightforward loss of their invested capital. They thus are deliberate in the composition of 
the portfolio of their debtors and try to sort out creditworthy borrowers from those that they 
believe to be prone to failure. But how do banks decide about the creditworthiness of a 
particular borrower in an environment in which an objective evaluation is not possible?  
 
The answer is simple. Banks use conventionally derived rules of thumb in order minimize the 
                                                 
2 Recently this especially extends to the maximization of power over financial assets which in turn allows for 
exerting power over other firms.  
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uncertainty related to their credit granting decisions. Though, the heterogeneity of agents 
leads to differences in the exposure to uncertainty (Stockhammer and Ramskogler 2007). 
Thus a bank can and will minimize the uncertainty to which their pool of borrowers is 
exposed. The confidence of a bank in whatever conventionally derived forecast about the 
creditworthiness of a borrower consequently is crucially influenced by the general degree of 
uncertainty to which this borrower is exposed. Banks discriminate against borrowers that 
face a higher degree of uncertainty.  
 
As however also potential borrowers rely on arbitrarily derived decisional rules there is no 
guarantee that the decisions of banks are compatible with those of credit applicants. 
Situations of asymmetric expectations can occur in which borrowers believe their projects to 
be worthwhile investment while banks do not (Wolfson 1996). Due to expectational 
mismatches there always will be a ‘fringe of unsatisfied borrowers’ that constitutes a 
demand-overhang for credit. Quantitative restrictions are a regular occurrence in a monetary 
production economy (Wray 1992 p.305, Dow 1996; 1998). Contrary to the traditional view 
however, these restrictions are not caused by a failure of the price mechanism that is 
incapable of equilibrating supply and demand. In the Post Keynesian perception quantitative 
credit restrictions are the result of the discretionary decisions of banks’ to discriminate 
against certain (groups of) borrowers.  
 
Power, uncertainty and size  
As the bank’s perception determines the constitution of the fringe of ‘unsatisfied borrowers 
there are certain market applicants that are more likely to be refused credit than others found 
in the ‘fringe of unsatisfied borrowers’ than others. In order to identify the members of this 
group it is necessary to leave the world of perfect competition as a first step. Once it is 
realized that actual markets are far more akin to oligopolies one can identify heterogeneous 
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agents that perform different roles in the market.3 In oligopolies there are market leaders and 
market followers each having a peculiar role and position. In such markets there can exist 
monopolistic power and an uneven distribution of this power amongst market participants.  
 
Typically hereby (partial) market leadership and size of firms coincide. Larger enterprises 
often act as market leaders within their sectors and are able to influence prices, qualities and 
even quantities of the goods traded. The control over substantial amounts of capital leaves 
them in a position to react more flexibly to an uncertain event than a small enterprise 
possibly can. They have the potential to threaten off potential market entrants and to control 
their competitors. Often they enjoy at least some degree of monopsony adverse (some of) 
their suppliers as well as adverse their workers.4 Small firms on the other hand often have to 
accept prices set by market leaders or monopsonistic customers both with regard to input 
goods as well as with regard to their outputs. They run the danger of a sudden strategic move 
of a larger enterprise trying to bid competitors out of the market. They have less ability with 
regard to their control over capital as well as with regard to price tolerance to react on 
unforeseen events. Put briefly large enterprises typically enjoy a substantial degree of power 
over small firms. Power thus increases over-proportionately with the size of a firm.  
 
As a result larger enterprises have more ability to pass on uncertainty, i.e. the responsibility 
to carry an adverse impact of an uncertain event. They can coerce their customers, suppliers 
and workers to accept contractual terms that leave them with the most disagreeable impacts 
of uncertain events. Often the flipside of this ability is that small enterprises have to carry 
                                                 
3 The effects of the relationship between power and uncertainty in oligopolistic markets with regard to the 
process of technological innovation have recently been elaborated by Courvisanos (2005).  
4 At least in an environment with persistent unemployment firms can exert “firing threat” against their workers 
to improve their own bargaining position (see Stockhammer 2007 for a more elaborate argument). Especially 
with sector-specific human capital monopsonistic aspects increase this power amongst relatively large firms. 
 10
this uncertainty. As a result we arrive at the proposition that the exposure to uncertainty is 
inversely related to the size of a firm. The result with regard to the credit granting process is 
straightforward. The confidence in expectations about an applicant is influenced by the 
degree of uncertaitny to which this applicant is exposed. Thus banks hold expectations in 
small firms with a lower degree of confidence. For firms at the expectational margin size can 
become the essential element that on which the provision or the refusal of a loan depend. The 
generally restricted access to credit from which small firms suffer is thus a logical result of 
the shape of oligopolistic markets.  
 
Heterogenity in the banking sector 
Having established that SMEs are credit constrained because an investment in SMEs is goes 
with a higher degree of uncertainty the question remains why small banks are less reluctant 
to lend to SMEs than large banks. In order to answer this question it is useful to start with the 
specific characteristics of a credit contract. A bank hands out a certain amount of money 
against the promise of the borrower to repay it with interest within the stipulated time. This 
promise enables a bank to credit the asset side of its balance sheet with the (present 
discounted value of the) claim against the debtor. The claim then remains as an asset in a 
banks balance sheet. When a borrower defaults on the loan however a bank has to write it off 
and the balance sheet is shortened by the outstanding amount. This is lender’s risk and can 
lead to an increasing a bank’s leverage ratio (and with it its risk as Kalecki’s principle of 
increasing risk indicates). Lender’s risk in combination with the average bank-borrower size 
ratio can affect a bank’s exposure to uncertainty.5  
 
                                                 
5 It is not indicated that the bank-borrower size ratio could be used to ‘measure uncertainty’. In this paper the 
bank-borrower size ratio simply serves as a proxy of the ability to shift the impact of uncertain events onto 
others.  
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A healthy bank will cope easily with the default of a loan that is small in relation to its own 
size. The relevant question from a bank’s point of view is how large the percentage of its 
assets at stake is in relation to its overall assets. The absolute value of a potentially lost asset 
is irrelevant in this respect. The default of a borrower whose loan accounts for a considerable 
amount of a bank’s overall assets can vitally hit a bank. Thus the danger of bankruptcy of a 
large borrower – usually coinciding with a large firm – can vitally hit a small bank whereas it 
might only scratch a large bank.  
 
While this first of all seems to be a question of a bank’s confidence into a particular borrower 
its potential impact becomes obvious when the power-relations between the bank and the 
borrower are considered. A relatively large borrower might be able to gain monopsonistic 
power and thus weaken the bargaining position of a bank. To improve her conditions a big 
customer can threaten a bank to look for funds somewhere else and to thereby shorten the 
bank’s balance substantially. She might even threaten to default. These threats that a big 
borrower is able to apply bestows her with substantial power that she can use to pass on the 
impact of an uncertain event to her bank (e.g through extending/ increasing credit, debt 
moratoria etc.). As a result the lending relationship – which originally attributes the more 
powerful position to the bank – can be inverted. A high ‘degree of monopsony’ in a bank’s 
balance sheet thus increases the Bank’s exposure to uncertainty substantially.  
 
A high ‘degree of monopsony’ in a bank’s balance sheet might even lead to a situation where 
the discretion of granting (lines of) credit slides (partially) out of the banks’ hands. Under the 
assumption of an endogenous money supply this is not prima facie impossible. However, 
when a bank expands credit more rapidly than the banking sector it has to take up funds in 
the inter-bank markets and her leverage ratio begins to rise (Dymski 1988). Alternatively it 
has to aggressively bid for deposits which erodes the interest differential between the rate 
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paid for funds and the rate received for credits. Both, increased leverage ratios and decreased 
interest differentials suppress a bank’s liquidity and hence reduce its ability to encounter 
unexpected events. Larger borrowers however require higher lines of credit that are entirely 
outside the scope of a bank’s discretion and they might exert their monopsonistic power to 
receive them. Thus the smaller the average bank-borrower ratio is the harder it is for the bank 
to closely track the expansionary path of the banking sector; again this increases a bank’s 
uncertainty.  
 
Thus, originating out of the management of uncertainty, bargaining relations and balance 
sheet considerations small banks find it more secure to specialize in small borrowers. This 
even is the case as this group of borrowers generally signifies a higher degree of uncertainty. 
As an overall result however we find a general asymmetry of the distribution of uncertainty 
amongst lenders as well as amongst borrowers. Modern monetary production economies thus 
are characterized by an uneven size-related distribution of uncertainty amongst market 
participants. Both small firms and small banks are less powerful and more uncertain. This 
puts them in a position that makes them more akin to instability and failure than larger 
enterprises. Over the course of recurrent slumps this will lead to a systemic and structural 
process of concentration within both the financial and the production sector. The ongoing 
“consolidation” of the banking sector (Huffschmid 2002, Chap 2) seems to be the most 
visible augury of this situation.  
 
Conclusions 
 
This paper has dealt with access restrictions to credit. The predominant approach of 
relationship banking has been sketched. This approach maintains that the difficulties of 
SMEs to obtain credit problem can be explained through the principal agent problem and the 
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theory of hierarchical control. This was contrasted with an approach that builds on the Post 
Keynesian concept of fundamental uncertainty. Hereby, we have started from the observation 
that the exposure to uncertainty is modifiable and can be distributed through the exercise of 
power. In oligopolistic markets power and the command over resources, i.e. firm size, is 
positively related. Consequently, large enterprises have substantial power and thus have a 
capability to shift their uncertainty. This increases – directly and relatively – the uncertainty 
associated with small firms. Accordingly, smaller firms are exposed to a higher degree of 
uncertainty and unattractive investments. Yet, the power-uncertainty-size nexus potentially 
enables borrowers to exert power over their lenders as well. Thus, a small bank-borrower size 
ratio potentially attributes monopsonistic power to borrowers. Therefore, small banks try to 
avoid a high degree of monopsony amongst their borrowers. Consequently, even though 
small firms are more uncertain investments, small banks remain a potential contact point for 
SMEs. These findings are consistent with the initially presented evidence.  
 
The implications of the presented Post Keynesian approach differ sharply from the 
implications of the traditional credit rationing approach. First, we find that credit restrictions 
are by no means a transitory phenomenon as some proponents of the literature on relationship 
lending argue (e.g. Cole et. 1999). Rather credit restrictions are an important symptom of the 
distribution of uncertainty within capitalist economies and contribute to existing power 
relationships. Second, the distribution of profits matters. It is mainly SMEs whose access to 
funds is restricted. If the overall profit rate increases and accordingly monopoly power rises, 
additional profits might be simply absorbed by the larger enterprises whose access to external 
funds is not restrained. The possibility exists that such profit increases are simply allocated to 
increased dividend payments (Stockhammer 2005-06). Thus there is no reason to believe that 
an increase in the profit rates alleviates the impact of credit rationing and leads to increased 
investment.    
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 The above model of course only offers a hypothesis. Further empirical testing would be 
desirable. Especially the uncertainty-power nexus might be an interesting field of further 
research.  
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